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Introduction
The reasons for, characteristics of and the myriad socio-economic and cultural implications resulting from policies of global airline deregulation, air transport liberalisation and the dramatic growth of low cost carriers (LCCs) worldwide have attracted considerable political, academic, and public attention. Worldwide, numerous articles, reports, and empirical analyses have been conducted into virtually every facet of LCC operation, from the corporate business philosophies, marketing, and revenue management strategies adopted by the principal protagonists, to the development of their route networks, their relationships with airports, and customer experiences of low cost flying (see Section 2). The majority of research has focused on the socio-economic benefits and 'success stories' associated with the emergence of a new type of airline that took advantage of the more liberalised operating environment to develop new business models and operating practices that avoided the expense associated with traditional full-service airline offerings, lowered their cost base and allowed them to pass the savings on to consumers in the form of lower fares.
Scholars from a variety of academic disciplines have examined the regional economic benefits that may result from the formation of new LCCs, the impact of new routes and destinations on competition and/or the effect of LCC product and service innovations on employees, subcontractors, consumers and competitors (see section 2). In contrast, little research has explored the characteristics of LCC failure and market exit. Considering the volatility of airlines and air traffic, particularly during periods of economic recession, this is a significant omission. It thus represents a highly topical and critical issue for policy makers, regions, airports and consumers.
Certainly, the implications of routes being withdrawn, links being severed at short notice and airlines ceasing operations are potentially far reaching, especially for regions with limited alternative air service provision or sources of employment.
In response to the paucity of empirical research into LCC failure and the need to identify factors which may contribute to LCC market exit, the aim of this paper is to undertake a comprehensive study of LCC market entry and exit in Europe between 1992 and 2012. The paper begins by reviewing the salient literatures on low cost carriers before the method is described and the temporal, operational and spatial characteristics of European LCC market entry and exit are described. The paper discusses the characteristics of LCC market exit that have been identified and concludes by examining the implications of LCC market failure for airline and airport operators, competition, and consumers both within Europe and in emerging LCC markets in other world regions.
The LCC phenomenon
The emergence, expansion and evolution of low cost carriers over the last 35 years has been well documented and arguably represents one of the most significant developments in recent commercial aviation history (Calder 2002; Lawton 2002; Gross and Lück 2013) . Pioneered by Texas-based Southwest Airlines and widely adopted in the immediate aftermath of the 1978 US Airline Deregulation Act, subsequent policies of air transport liberalisation in Europe and parts of Latin America, Africa, the Middle and Far East, Indian subcontinent and Australasia from the mid-1990s onwards (see Doganis 1994 , Williams 1994 , Caves 1997 and Goetz and Sutton 1997 for an overview) has meant that low cost carriers have become an increasingly global phenomenon that have dramatically reconfigured the patterns, processes, customer expectations and experiences of flight. Globally, the LCC sector has expanded rapidly to the point where LCCs now account for 22% of all passenger flights and 26% of all airline seats worldwide (OAG, 2012) . Despite significant regional variation both between and within different LCC markets, some of the most dramatic growth is currently occurring in the rapidly expanding economies and recently liberalised air transport markets in Asia and the Middle East. However, in terms of regional market penetration, LCCs have arguably had the biggest impact in Europe where they currently account for over 28% of all passenger flights (OAG, 2011) .
Although there is no universally accepted definition of what constitutes a low cost carrier, Button and Ison (2008) suggest that LCCs can be distinguished from other airlines on account of the former's close adherence to many (if not all) of the following cost-minimisation strategies: To reduce maintenance and training costs, ease scheduling, and take advantage of bulk purchase discounts from manufacturers, most LCCs operate a single aircraft type (usually Boeing 737 or Airbus A320 family airframes) and a single airframe-engine combination. These aircraft are configured with an all-economy class cabin to maximise the numbers of revenue-earning seats that are available and they are flown on frequent short-haul point-to-point services, often between cheaper and less congested secondary regional airports. In order to maximise aircraft utilisation, each aircraft performs multiple services in a day and are turned around between flights in as little as 30 minutes. LCC operations are further characterised by their 'no frills' cabin service policy and limited customer service. Typically, LCCs also make extensive use of ancillary revenue generation and have transformed conventional cost items including hold baggage and in-flight catering into revenue streams. To further minimise costs, they often enter into commercial partnerships with third-party companies (such as accommodation providers and car-hire firms), subcontract aspects of their operation, engage in bold and often controversial marketing and use the internet for the majority of their distribution.
Much of the early literature on the emergence and growth of European low cost aviation examined the nature of the low cost model and the operating practices of its principal protagonists (see Lawton 2002; Calder 2002; Alamdari and Fagan 2005) .
This body of work quickly expanded to include the impact of LCCs on legacy operators and on competition (Francis et al 2007; Doganis 2010; Fageda et al 2011) , examine how LCCs have changed the nature of the airline-airport relationship (Francis et al 2003 (Francis et al , 2004 Starkie 2012; Graham, 2013) as well as the economic impact of new LCC services on patterns of business, tourism, and migration (Graham and Dennis 2010, Castillo-Manzano et al 2011) . Other studies have focused on LCCs' revenue management and pricing strategies (Gillen and Morrison 2003, Alves et al 2009) , their use of ICT and the internet (Hanlon 2007; Calder 2002) , the spatial distribution and evolution of their route networks (Dobruszkes 2013) , the charismatic management styles of LCC leadership (Calder 2002 ) and customer experiences of low cost flying (Mason 2000) .
Crucially, and with the notable exception of Button (2012) , very little has been written about LCC failure or market exit despite the volatile and highly competitive nature of the European airline sector. In order to identify the characteristics of market failure and LCC market exit in Europe, a comprehensive continent-wide study of LCC market entry and exit in Europe between 1992 and 2012 was conducted.
Method
Every low cost carrier that was registered and actively operating revenue-generating flights in Europe -defined here as members of the European Economic Area (i.e.
European Union members plus Norway, Switzerland and Iceland) -between 1992 and 2012 was identified from an exhaustive online interrogation of aviation databases, airline resource sites, and academic publications. Only European airlines that flew under their own air operator's certificate and/or functioned as a distinct low cost operation were included in the study. Non-European based LCCs that serve European destinations, 'virtual' LCCs that sold tickets on behalf of other operators but who did not operate their own aircraft and 'paper' LCCs which were proposed but which never operated a revenue service (such as UK-based low cost operator 'Now') were not considered. Similarly airlines including Monarch (UK) and Aer Lingus (Ireland) who experimented with cost cutting in the mid-2000s but who didn't create a separate low cost subsidiary were excluded as were ad-hoc charter operators who supplied aircraft and/or crew under contract to LCCs.
One of the principal challenges inherent in this approach was the lack of a definitive and universally-accepted list of which airlines could be rightly classified as being 'low cost'. In order to resolve this issue, the extent to which each airline's business model aligned with the principal LCC operating characteristics identified by Button and Ison (2008) was used as the framework. Any carrier whose operating practices did not conform with at least eight of the defining characteristics was excluded from the study. As a result, airlines including Italian regional operator Alpi Eagles, UK regional airline FlyBe and Finnish carrier Air Finland, all of which have been identified as LCCs in some quarters, were not included (Klophaus et al, JATM 23) . For each airline, the Flightglobal and airliners.net databases were interrogated to determine the date of market entry and, if applicable, the date of its final flight/market exit and fate (e.g. bankruptcy, merger, take-over or subsumed within the parent airline's operations). For the purposes of this paper, an airline was deemed to have left the market when it ceased flight operations for the final time. Germanwings are used by full service operators Iberia and Lufthansa respectively and can be seen at major airports, including London/Heathrow, and Norwegian has announced plans to establish a new low cost long-haul operation using Boeing 787s.
Findings and discussion
In the subsections that follow the chronology of European LCC market entry and the characteristics of market exit is examined.
Chronology of European LCC market entry
A chronology of European LCC market entry is presented in Table 2 . From this data, it is possible to disaggregate the airlines into groups according to when they commenced operations and create a four-phase classification system of European LCC market entry. Pioneers (1992 Pioneers ( -1998 Between 1992 and 1998, eight carriers commenced low cost operations in Europe. 
Chronology and typology of LCC market exit
In addition to categorising LCCs according to the year they entered the market, a number of significant spatial, temporal, and operational characteristics relating to LCC failure and market exit in the European LCC sector can be identified. Initially, low cost flying was largely a phenomenon of the more industrialised and economically prosperous countries of northwest Europe before it spread south and east to the Mediterranean and Central and Eastern Europe at the turn of the millennium. As Dobruszkes (2013) has shown the expansion of LCC services to and within Central and Eastern Europe parallels EU enlargement and the accompanying expansion of the liberalised market. However, the number of subsequent LCC failures indicates that the supply of flights between certain airport pairs and within certain countries outweighed consumer demand for flights while intense competition between airlines forced financially weaker operations to leave the market.
Although it has become something of a cliché to assert that it is possible to learn more from failure than it is from success, it can be instructive to examine past performance to try and identify characteristics of market failure in order to try and avoid their repetition. In this section of the paper, the focus is specifically on the temporal, spatial, and operating characteristics of the 33 European LCCs that left the market between the year of the first failure, in 1999, and 2012. The operating history of the 33 failed airlines is presented in Figure 1 . While it may be possible to map LCC failure to world events to offer an explanation for their demise, it is also necessary to examine both when the failed LCCs commenced operations and also which type of LCC model they adopted to ascertain whether particular types of operation were more or less vulnerable to failure.
Significantly, the later an airline commenced operations, the shorter its average period of operation (Figure 3 ). 
Ownership characteristics of failed LCCs
50% (17 of the 34) failed European LCCs were 'privately owned' by individuals or by corporations that previously had no involvement in commercial aviation activities. A further 11 (32%) were owned or established by existing airlines and/or travel companies. The ownership of the remaining six could not be conclusively determined.
In terms of operational success, the majority of privately owned LCCs failed less than two years after they were formed whereas airline-owned LCCs fared better. 60% of FSC subsidiaries and diversified charter operators lasted for more than four years before ceasing operations and three operated for over 10 years.
LCCs that were owned or established by an existing airline had the inherent advantage of having access to experienced managers who could devise (and then often be seconded to run) the new operation. The original Chief Executive of UKbased Go, Barbara Cassani, for example, moved from her post within British Airways to lead the new low cost venture. A further advantage for airline-owned LCCs is that they may also have the financial and/or organisational backing of the parent company (such as Channel Express' support for Jet2 and TUI's for Thomsonfly) and thus have immediate access to suitable aircraft, trained engineers, a pool of qualified flight crew and ground staff, and access to established online computer reservation systems. They may also conversely, however, be potentially disadvantaged by the historical legacy and operational inertia of the parent company.
Some of the FSC subsidiaries and diversified charter LCCs analysed ceased operations following strategic decisions taken by their parent companies to halt LCC services and concentrate on their core brand. Independent LCC operators, on the other hand, while they may not have enjoyed such generous financial backing or access to immediate technical and human resources may have been able to be more flexible and innovative. Indeed, it is often the originally independent and privately-owned LCCs, like easyJet, who have driven developments in ICT, internet reservations and social media and taken inspiration from other areas of corporate business strategy and successfully applied them to the commercial aviation sector.
The relative 'size' of failed LCCs
In addition to the date when they entered the market and their ownership structure, the relative 'size' of individual LCCs and the strategic decisions they make about aircraft are also important indicators of likely success or failure. Although the relative 'size' of airlines can be measured by a number of individual metrics, including annual revenue passenger kilometres, number of employees, number of routes operated, number of different countries served, number of passengers transported and operating revenue, use is made of the number of destinations served and the number and composition of aircraft in their fleet at the point they ceased operations as a proxy for the relative size and scope of their operations (Table 3) . Of the 332 aircraft these LCCs collectively operated, 57% were B737 family and 18%
were A320 family members (e.g. A319s, A320s or A321s) with smaller numbers of Fokker 70s and Fokker 100s (10%), BAe146s (6%) and MD80/82/83s (4%) (see Figure 5 ). The remaining proportion was made up B767s, CRJ900s, B757s, Let 410s
and a single ATR42-500. Over 99% were jet aircraft and only 1% (3 aircraft) were turboprops (two Let 410s and a single ATR-42). Of the 32 of the 34 failed LCCs for which fleet data is available, 60% operated one type of aircraft, 31% flew 2 and 9% operated 3. In this context, B737 Classics (i.e.
B737-300, B737-400 and B737-500 series) were distinguished from Next Generation B737-700 and B738-800 airframes. MD80/82/83 were counted as one type as were F70/100 and Boeing 767-200s and -300s on grounds of type commonality and multiaircraft type rating.
In contrast, at the time of writing, 6 of the 9 surviving LCCs operate a single type of aircraft, Jet2 operate 2 (B737-300 and B757-200), Norwegian operate 3 (B737-300 and B737-800 and A340 respectively) and Air Berlin operate 5 (A320 family, A330, B737NG family, . Thus fleet diversity (which conventionally has been seen as a detriment to a low cost base) does not appear to be a barrier to success. What is interesting, however, is the aircraft mix of surviving LCCs. Of the 854 aircraft they collectively operate 98.8% are jets and 1.2% are props (Dash-8s).
Just under half (49.5%) are B737NGs and 43% are A320 family aircraft. Similarly, although the number of aircraft and the 'size' of an airline's operation undoubtedly confers significant economies of scale, not all the surviving LCCs have large fleets.
Although Ryanair with 303 B737-800s has the largest fleet and both easyJet and Air 
The geography of European LCC failure
LCC success and failure in Europe has a significant spatial dimension. The first LCCs to enter the market were predominately based in countries of northwestern Europe and initially began flying services between secondary or regional airports in the hinterland of major European cities (the only notable early exception to this was Virgin Express who were based at Zanvantem airport). As a consequence, they initially avoided direct airport-pair competition with incumbent full-service operators and were able to carve out a distinct operating niche that complemented, rather than directly competed with, existing FSC and regional airline services. Although liberalisation is a feature of all EU member states, LCCs have only emerged in a few countries. The 34 LCCs that left the market originated in 16 different countries although of these, almost a third (29%) were registered in the UK (one of the first countries to liberalise bilateral air service agreements) while a further 3 each came from Italy, Germany and Sweden. LCC Snowflake was unusual in that it was a subsidiary of the pan-national SAS (formerly Scandinavian Airlines System). While it is possible to advance speculative theories as to why Austria, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Switzerland have not been the home of LCCs start-ups, proving direct causal relationships is fraught with difficulty and thus regrettably remains beyond the scope of this paper.
Conclusion
While it is appreciated that airline failure and volatility is of course not restricted to the low cost sector, it is important to note that studies of LCCs have often focused on their success and their impact on competition and legacy carriers. While it is very difficult to create a guaranteed recipe for LCC success, our research has shown there are a number of features that characterise failed carriers and it is to these characteristics the final section of the paper now turns.
As Alamdari and Fagan (2005) suggested, strict adherence to the original Southwest inspired low cost model appears to be an important element of success. This requires carriers to only fly one type of aircraft to keep costs low and select an aircraft that seats over 130 passengers and offers both good service reliability and fuel efficiency. It also requires carriers to identify routes that will generate sufficient, sustained and preferably year-round long-term demand and revenues. Indeed, it could be argued that a number of LCCs have failed as a result of the routes they operated and the aircraft they flew. UK-registered LCC EUJet, for example, flew a fleet of Fokker 100 aircraft on services to/from the relatively inaccessible Manston Airport in Kent but was unable to generate the financial returns required to remain operational. In contrast, Ryanair has developed into a highly successful low cost operator that flies 303 B737-800 aircraft and over 79 million passengers a year to/from multiple destinations at secondary airports across Europe (Ryanair 2013) while easyJet has grown from an operation employing two leased aircraft in 1995 to an airline operating 193 aircraft and carrying over 59 million passengers a year in
(easyJet 2013).
If it is possible to define a recipe for success, creating a strong and memorable brand and product, being one of the first entrants into a market, basing operations somewhere in north-western Europe, adhering to the original Southwest Airlines 
